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THE EMPIRE FORGOTTEN:
THE APPLICATION OF THE BILL OF
RIGHTS TO U.S. TERRITORIES
Alan Taubert
I. INTRODUCTION
For over a century, the United States government has been a colo-
nial power. Since the founding of the Republic, the United States has
held control of territory not part of any state. This territorial owner-
ship has continued unbroken from 1789 until the present day. How-
ever, in 1898 the character of this ownership changed dramatically.
Prior to the Spanish-American War the United States only acquired
territory with the understanding that it would eventually be incorpo-
rated into the Union in the form of one or more states, and that the
people residing in those territories would be granted full citizenship
rights and join the American polity.' This all changed when the
United States signed the Treaty of Paris in 1898, ending the war with
Spain. As part of the peace agreement, Spain ceded control of the
islands of Puerto Rico, Cuba, the Philippines, and Guam to the con-
trol of the United States.
For the first time in its history, the United States found itself in
possession of land that was both far flung from the contiguous states
of the Union, and not intended for eventual statehood. In an effort to
deal with this unique situation, the Congress of the United States
turned to Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution, which grants it the
power to "dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations re-
t J.D. 2004, The George Washington University. Graduate student in political science at
the University of South Carolina. The author would like to thank Professor Peter Smith and the
staff of the Case Western Reserve Law Review for all their help in editing and commenting on
this article. Any errors are mine alone.
I The only exceptions to this general rule were the Native American tribes or nations who
the United States government continued to treat as quasi-sovereign bodies. This exception is
unimportant for purposes of this paper for two reasons: First, the territory reserved to the Native
Americans was and is within the bounds of states of the Union. Second, all Native Americans
were granted United States citizenship in 1922. 8 U.S.C. § 1401a (1922).
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specting the territory ... of the United States."2 Almost immediately
challenges to regulations arose and made their way to the United
States Supreme Court to determine what exactly were the limits of
this power and whether these territories were part of the United
States, as that term was used in various provisions of the Constitution.
In a series of opinions known as the Insular Cases, the Supreme
Court ruled that these lands were "foreign in a domestic sense" and
that they were not a part of the United States for all constitutional
purposes.3 The Court, utilizing what has come to be known as the
Territorial Incorporation Doctrine, ruled that since these new posses-
sions were not destined for eventual statehood the full Constitution
did not apply. Most importantly, not all the provisions of the Bill of
Rights "follow the flag," and therefore, they do not apply in these
territories. This article argues that, after a century of colonial rule, any
vitality the Insular Cases may once have had has faded, and thus,
these cases should be allowed to flow into constitutional obscurity.4
This question has become even more important in light of recent
developments as the United States extends its power over both citi-
zens and foreign nationals outside U.S. borders. In recent years, the
Court has relied on the Insular Cases to hold that the full protection
of the Bill of Rights does not extend beyond our borders.5 As more
and more people fall under the dominion of U.S. law it is important to
re-examine the underpinnings of the doctrine being used to deny them
the full panoply of Constitutional rights.
Part II of this article examines the history of territorial acquisition
and regulation beginning with the Ordinance of 1787, which was first
passed under the Articles of Confederation, and traces it through the
four major land acquisitions of the first century: the Louisiana Pur-
chase, the treaty acquiring Florida, the Treaty of Guadeloupe Hidalgo,
and the Treaty of Paris. This Part concludes with an examination of
the Treaty of Paris and compares its terms with earlier treaties.
2 U.S. CONST. art. IV § 3, cl. 2.
3 Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901);
Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Four-
teen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S.
221 (1901); Huus v. New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901); Hawaii v. Manki-
chi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Kepner v. United States, 195 US. 100 (1904); Dorr v. United States,
195 U.S. 138 (1904); Rasmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905); Dowdell v. United
States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914); Balzac v. Porto
Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
4 In this call, I join Professor T. Alex Aleinikoff, who argues for "more flexible under-
standings of membership [in the United States] that would legitimate new arrangements in-
tended to promote self-determination and equality." T. ALEXANDER ALEINIXKOFF, SEMBLANCES
OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 7 (2002).
5 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
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Part ImI then turns to an examination of the Insular Cases them-
selves. It begins with an examination of the Dred Scott decision,
which first spoke of the application of constitutional provisions to
U.S. territories. It then moves on to the first Insular Case, which dealt
with the Uniform Duties Clause of Article I, before turning to the
Territorial Incorporation Doctrine first articulated by the first Justice
White in a concurring opinion in Downes v. Bidwell.6 This article then
traces the development of this doctrine and its eventual adoption by
the Court in Balzac v. Porto Rico.7 It continues with an examination
of the cases dealing with the application of the Bill of Rights to the
territories. It discusses the fundamental/procedural rights distinction
used by the Court and the often racist discourse that colors much of
the Court's rhetoric in these cases.
Part IV then turns to potential solutions to the problems caused by
the Insular Cases and the Territorial Incorporation Doctrine. It exam-
ines the benefits and disadvantages of four potential solutions includ-
ing extension of the Bill of Rights by Congress, incorporation of the
territories, overruling of the Insular Cases, and independence for
these protectorates. The article then concludes by calling for the re-
versal of the Insular Cases and the extension of the full Bill of Rights
to currently held U.S. territories. 8
II. HISTORY OF TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION
The history of territorial acquisition in the United States stretches
back to the very founding of the Republic. In fact, the first major or-
dinance dealing with territory not held by any state was passed by the
Confederation Congress in 1787. 9 The statute controlled the lands
north of the Ohio River and to the west of the thirteen original colo-
nies, commonly referred to as the Northwest Territory. This territory
was originally held by the individual states but they relinquished their
titles in response to a resolution by the Confederation Congress
passed October 10, 1780, following a recommendation from Mary-
land in 1777.10 The State of Virginia was the first to respond to this
resolution when, in 1784, it ceded all its claims to the United States."
6 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901) (white, J., concurring).
258 U.S. 298 (1922).
8 In this way, I hope to help spark a fresh look at the status debate and help "put in play
new understandings of sovereignty that provide space for subnational governance without
undermining the national state." ALEINIKOFF, supra note 4, at 7.
9 CONFEDERATE CONGRESS, U.S. Ordinance of 1787 (July 13, 1787).
10 MAX FARRAND, THE LEGISLATION OF CONGRESS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
ORGANIZED TERRITORIES OFTHE UNITED STATES, 1789-1895, 6 (William S. Hein & Co. 2000)
(1896).
1l Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (1 How.) 393, 433 (1856).
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Massachusetts and Connecticut quickly followed suit.' 2 Having been
ceded these lands, the Confederation Congress was then required to
legislate for the government of this new territory. Thus, the Confed-
eration Congress passed the now famous Ordinance of 1787, which
became the basis for all future territorial governments. 3
A. The Ordinance of 1787
The Ordinance of 1787 was actually the fourth ordinance passed
dealing with the government of the Northwest Territory, but it was
the one that served as the model for all future territorial ordinances
within the continental United States. The Ordinance served the dual
purpose of providing for the governing of the contiguous territories as
well as the rights of the individuals who resided therein. 
4
The Ordinance was understood to be a temporary measure, gov-
erning the territories until such a time as they were fit for full state-
hood, and this was reflected in the first paragraph of the Ordinance.
15
It provided for limited representation in the U.S. Congress, allowing
each territory a delegate who would have the right to debate but not to
vote.' 6 The Fifth Article of the Ordinance provided for the breakdown
of the Northwest Territory into three to five states, all of which were
to be admitted on equal footing with the original colonies upon
achieving a population of sixty thousand free inhabitants.1 7 The final
article, which led to much dispute later, outlawed slavery within the
territory. 18 This would eventually lead to the Dred Scott opinion,
which laid the foundation for all future applications of the Constitu-
tion to U.S. territories. Upon the formation of the Union and the new
Constitution, the Ordinance was rapidly re-enacted with appropriate
modifications necessary to conform to the new governing document.' 9
One of the first questions that arose in regards to territorial gov-
ernment had to do with the full extent of Congress's powers over this
property. Under Article IV, Section 3, Congress has virtually unfet-
tered power to regulate the territories. The only real check appeared
in the form of the Article H appointment power; while Congress was
12 FARRAND, supra note 10, at 5-6.
13 Id. at 8-9. See also, JAMEs E. KERR, THE INSULAR CASES: THE ROLE OF THE
JUDICIARY IN AMERICAN ExPANsIONISM 4 (1982).
14 FARRAND, supra note 10, at 9.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 10. Those familiar with territorial governance in the modem age will note that
currently, Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia have similar non-voting delegates, though
several of the territories do not.
17 Id. at 12.
18 Id.
'9 Id. at 14.
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free to create positions in territorial governments, it required the
President to fill them.
20
This question became extremely significant given the arguments
by many at the time that the territories did not retain any sovereignty,
as the states did, but rather were the property of the central
government.2' If this argument was correct, then it was unclear what
constitutional provisions applied to the territories. The countervailing
argument was that the term "United States" within the Constitution
was intended to extend to both the states and all lands held by the
federal government. This question was not easily answered, and
indeed came to the forefront with the next acquisition of territory by
the federal government: the Louisiana Purchase.
B. Treaty Provisions
The Louisiana Purchase was the first time the United States ac-
quired territory outside of that which it possessed at the end of the
Revolutionary War. Many people at the time, including President
Jefferson, were unsure that the Constitution allowed the federal gov-
ernment to acquire territory by treaty. President Jefferson in fact
sought a constitutional amendment to allow the purchase. 23 Eventu-
ally, the amendment was rejected and Congress decided that it was
within the inherent sovereign power of the United States to acquire
territory via treaty. 24 This was the main method of territorial acquisi-
tion from 1803 through the present day. As such, a look into the exact
terms of these treaties is warranted. This is especially important when
considering the extension of the Constitution to newly acquired terri-
tories because, until the Treaty of Paris in 1898, the treaties all had
some language mandating that the inhabitants and the territory would
be incorporated into the Union as soon as possible.
i. The Louisiana Purchase
In 1803, the United States entered into an agreement to purchase
all French holdings of land on the North American continent in the
20 KERR, supra note 13, at 4.
21 Id. at 5.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 6. See also Abbott Lawrence Lowell, The Status of Our New Possessions,
13 HARV. L. REv. 155, 163 (1899).
24 KERR, supra note 13, at 6. This decision did not end the controversy, however. Indeed,
the Court in Dred Scott supported a reading of the Territorial Clause of Article IV as only apply-
ing to the lands held as a territory at the time of the founding, and insisted that Congress must
find its regulatory power over the territories elsewhere. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (I
How.) 393, 436-42 (1856). Subsequent Courts later rejected this view.
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form of the Louisiana Purchase.25 Secretary of State James Madison
gave very specific instructions to the U.S. negotiators to the effect
that they "must not under any circumstances agree 'to incorporate the
inhabitants of the hereby ceded territory with the citizens of the
United States, being a provision which cannot now be made. ,,26 The
negotiators ignored these instructions and ended up inserting Article
III of the treaty, which provided as follows:
The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated
into the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as
possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitu-
tion, to the enjoyment of all rights, advantages and immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; and in the mean time they
shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of
their liberty, property and the religion which they profess.27
This provision is quite specific as to the treatment of the ceded
land and its inhabitants. It calls for the incorporation of these people
into the Union as soon as permissible and requires that they be treated
on an equal footing as citizens of the United States, including all
rights and immunities. This provision seems to extend the full pano-
ply of rights contained in the Bill of Rights to the newly acquired
territory. Most importantly, for purposes of this article, it specifically
calls for the incorporation of the territory and its peoples into the
United States.
ii. Florida
The territory of Florida was acquired from Spain via a treaty
concluded February 22, 1819.28 Article VI of the treaty was lifted
almost word-for-word from Article JI of the Louisiana Purchase
treaty.29 It provided for the incorporation of the inhabitants of the
Florida Territory into the Union and secured the enjoyment of all
privileges, rights, and immunities of United States citizens for them.
30
Article V of the treaty specifically secured the exercise of free
religion within the territory. 1
25 Louisiana Purchase Treaty, U.S.-Fr., Apr. 30, 1803, 8 Stat. 206.
26 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 324 (1900) (White, J., concurring). See also Lowell,
supra note 23, at 164.
27 Downes, 182 U.S. at 324-25 (quoting 8 Stat. 202).
2 FARRAND, supra note 10, at 30.
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Despite these treaty provisions, there was still some doubt as to
whether territories acquired in this manner stood on the same footing
as the territories owned when the United States came into being.
32
This question was first addressed by the Supreme Court in American
Insurance Company v. Canter.33 Chief Justice Marshall did not decide
the question because it was not directly before the Court. Rather he
stated, after reciting Article VI of the treaty, that "[t]his treaty is the
law of the land, and admits the inhabitants of Florida to the enjoyment
of the privileges, rights, and immunities, of the citizens of the United
States." 34 The Court finally answered the question of the status of the
territories acquired through treaty in Cross v. Harrison, a case about
the Treaty of Guadeloupe Hidalgo.35
iii. Guadeloupe Hidalgo
The Treaty of Guadeloupe Hidalgo ceded all claims of the Mexi-
can Government to the territory of California to the United States.
Article IX of the treaty contained similar language to the treaties with
Spain for Florida and France for Louisiana. It stated that all citizens
who chose not to preserve Mexican citizenship "shall be incorporated
into the Union of the United States and be admitted, at the proper
time (to be judged by the Congress of the United States), to the en-
joyment of all the rights of citizens of the United States according to
the principles of the Constitution.,
36
In Cross v. Harrison the Supreme Court finally decided that upon
signature of the Treaty of Guadeloupe Hidalgo California became a
part of the United States, and was thus subject to the Uniform Duties
Clause of the Constitution.37 This view was almost universally fol-
lowed after Cross.38 Notably, this was also the last treaty signed by
the United States government containing language dealing with the
incorporation of either the territory or its inhabitants into the United
States.39
32 Lowell, supra note 23, at 164.
33 American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 511 (1828).
34 Id. at 542.
35 Lowell, supra note 23, at 165.
36 KERR, supra note 13, at 83.
37 Lowell, supra note 23, at 165.
38 Id.
39 The treaty in which the United States acquired Alaska from Russia also contained simi-
lar language. Treaty Concerning the Cession of the Russian Possessions in North America by
His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias to the United States of America. U.S.-Russ., Mar.
30, 1876, 15 Stat. 539 (allowing Russians living in Alaska the option to become U.S. citizens).
See KERR, supra note 13, at 104. See also Lowell, supra note 23, at 171.
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C. Treaty of Paris
Following the Treaty of Paris, the people and Government of the
United States were faced with deciding the important question of
whether the Constitution "follows the flag." Unlike the previous ac-
quisitions that occurred through treaty, the Treaty of Paris made no
accommodation for the citizens or territory of Puerto Rico, Cuba, or
the Philippines as far as the "privileges, rights and immunities" of
citizens of the United States.
40
In fact, the Treaty actually took a step in the opposite direction.
Rather than merely ceding the lands and people to the United States,
Article IX of the Treaty provides that those living in the territories
mentioned who wished to renounce their Spanish citizenship would
be held "to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they
may reside. '41 The Treaty also provides that the "civil rights and po-
litical status" of those inhabitants would be determined by the Con-
gress of the United States.42 This was quite a departure from earlier
treaties that mandated equal rights between citizens of the United
States and citizens of the territories. Now, plenary control of the civil
and political rights of these inhabitants rested in the hands of a Con-
gress far removed, and in which they had no voice.
It was not long before the power of Congress was challenged and
the Supreme Court was forced to decide whether or not the Constitu-
tion "followed the flag." The Court provided a hybrid answer in
which some protections extended automatically, but others would
depend on congressional action. This article now turns to an analysis
of these decisions.
IH. THE INSULAR CASES
The Supreme Court answered the question of whether the Consti-
tution "follows the flag" in a series of cases commonly referred to as
the Insular Cases. The Insular Cases were based on disputes arising
from the acquisition of Puerto Rico and the Philippines, which the
U.S. obtained by the Treaty of Paris. While the exact cases that are in
this collection are sometimes disputed, the term is generally under-
stood to encompass a series of cases beginning with Huus v. New
York & Porto Rico S.S. Co.43 in 1901 and ending with Balzac v. Porto
40 See Lowell, supra note 23, at 171-72.
41 Id. at 172 (quoting Treaty of Paris, 30 Stat. 1758 (1898)).
42 Id.
43 182 U.S. 392 (1901).
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Rico" in 1922.45 Over the course of these twenty-one years, the focus
of these cases changed dramatically, moving away from a concentra-
tion on the Uniform Duties Clause to an examination of which rights
in the Bill of Rights, if any, applied to the territories. This article is
concerned with the second question, and thus focuses primarily on the
three cases of Downes v. Bidwell,46 in which Justice White's concur-
rence first laid out the Territorial Incorporation Doctrine, Dorr v.
United States,47 in which the Court first decided that the Bill of Rights
does not fully extend to territories, and finally Balzac v. Porto Rico
48
in which the Court finally adopted Justice White's Territorial Incor-
poration Doctrine as part of the majority opinion.
However, before turning to the Insular Cases, it is important to
understand the Court's previous views on the extension of the Consti-
tution to territories. Chief Justice Taney originally articulated this
view in the much-maligned opinion of Dred Scott v. Sandford.49
A. Dred Scott and Background
Dred Scott is best known for invalidating the Missouri Compro-
mise, which required the admission to the United States of one slave
state for every non-slave state. In order to make the ruling, however,
Chief Justice Taney had to examine the application of the Constitu-
tion to the territories in order to determine whether Congress had the
power to craft the compromise.
In a major departure from previous opinions on the subject, Chief
Justice Taney ruled that Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 was not the
proper source of Congressional power over the territory, holding that
this clause only applied to the territory held by the United States at
the time the Constitution was adopted, in other words, the Northwest
Territory.50 After analyzing the text of the provision, Chief Justice
Taney concluded that Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 "was a special
provision for a known and particular territory, and to meet a present
emergency, and nothing more.",5' While he acknowledged that this
section provided Congress with the power to exercise authority over
44 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
45 I note that there is some conflict because some authors choose to limit the Insular Cases
to six cases decided in 1901, while others expand the definition to include Balzac in which
Justice White's concurring opinion in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), was adopted by
the majority. For purposes of this paper, I use the expanded definition of the term Insular Cases.
4182 U.S. 244 (1901).
47 195 U.S. 138 (1901).
258 U.S. 298.
49 60 U.S. (1 How.) 393, 432 (1856).
50 Id. at 432.
5 1 Id.
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the Northwest Territory, it "can furnish no justification and no argu-
ment to support a similar exercise of power over territory afterwards
acquired by the Federal Government.,
52
Taney concluded that the power to acquire territory arose from
another clause in Article IV, Section 3, which allowed Congress to
admit new states to the Union.53 He held that this power to admit new
states must carry with it the concurrent power to acquire territory not
yet fit for admission at the time, "but to be admitted as soon as its
population and situation would entitle it to admission. 54 While
making this concession, Taney was adamant that "no power is given
to acquire a Territory to be held and governed permanently in that
character.,
55
Taney went on to state that setting the limits of the United States
was a political, not a judicial, question, and that the Court was bound
to recognize as part of the United States whatever the political
branches so recognized. He concluded this discussion by stating:
[A]s there is no express regulation in the Constitution defin-
ing the power which the General Government may exercise
over the person or property of a citizen in a Territory thus ac-
quired, the court must necessarily look to the provisions and
principles of the Constitution, and its distribution of powers,
for the rules and principles by which its decision must be
governed.... 56
Thus, Chief Justice Taney quite clearly laid out his belief, and the
majority's opinion, that the Constitution applied in the territories of
the United States. It was because the Constitution applied in the terri-
tories carrying with it the judicial branch's protection of the "personal
rights and rights of property of individual citizens, as protected by the
Constitution" that Justice Taney was able to strike down the Missouri
Compromise because it violated the property rights of United States
citizens.57
Justice Taney recognized unambiguously that the Constitution ex-
tends to any place that Congress's power extends; the two are co-
extensive. He held that the prohibition against the taking of property
was not confined to the states "but [that] the words are general, and
extend to the whole territory over which the Constitution gives [Con-
52 Id. at 442.
53 Id. at 447.
5 Id.
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gress] the power to legislate.... ,58 Thus, the Court had laid the basic
groundwork that the Constitution does apply to the territories of the
United States. Yet despite this clear and unambiguous language, the
debate was not over. Through the creation of the Territorial Incorpo-
ration Doctrine, the Insular Cases Courts would manage to edge
around Justice Taney' s holding in Dred Scott.
B. Uniform Duties Clause Cases
The first context in which the Court addressed our new territorial
possessions was under Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, the Uniform
Duties Clause. This clause grants Congress the power to impose du-
ties and excises on products but mandates that "all Duties, Imposts
and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States. '59 The
question raised before the Court centered on the meaning of the term
"United States." The Court first addressed the question in 1820 in
Loughborough v. Blake.6° Here, it was argued that the Uniform Duties
Clause applied to the District of Columbia. Chief Justice Marshall
delivered the unanimous opinion in which he stated:
The power then to lay and collect duties, imposts and excises,
may be exercised, and must be exercised throughout the
United States. Does the term designate the whole, or any par-
ticular portion of the American empire? Certainly this ques-
tion can admit but one answer. It is the name given to our
great republic, which is composed of States and territories.
The district of Columbia, or the territory west of Missouri, is
not less within the United States, than Maryland or Pennsyl-
vania; and it is not less necessary, on the principles of our
constitution, that uniformity in the imposition of imposts, du-
ties, and excises, should be observed in the one, than in the
other.6
1
This once again appears to be a clear and unambiguous statement that
the Constitution applies unequivocally in the territory controlled by
the United States. Yet, the Insular Cases Courts ignored this plain
reasoning and instead launched into an extensive analysis to deter-
mine if the territories of Puerto Rico and the Philippines fell within
the term "United States," as that term was used in the Uniform Duties
Clause.
58 Id. at 450.
59 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
- 18 U.S. 317 (1820).
61 Id. at 319.
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DeLima v. Bidwel 62, the very first Insular Case decided by the
Supreme Court, was the first case concerning the issue of Puerto
Rico's status. DeLima dealt with a challenge to duties collected in the
Port of New York on goods shipped from Puerto Rico. The Court
ruled that upon the ratification of the Treaty of Paris and the
assumption of U.S. control, Puerto Rico ceased being foreign for the
purposes of the tariff laws. 63 This case did not directly raise a
constitutional question, but rather dealt with a question of statutory
construction. The constitutional question did not arise until the Court
decided Downes v. Bidwell and started down the road that would
eventually end with the adoption of the Territorial Incorporation
Doctrine.
C. Downes v. Bidwell and the Territorial Incorporation Doctrine
The Territorial Incorporation Doctrine (TID) draws a distinction
between territories that have been "incorporated" into the United
States and those that have not. In this context, incorporation means
destined for eventual statehood. 64 The importance of the TID is
played out when examining the application of the Constitution to ter-
ritories held by the United States. Simply stated, the TID holds that
the Constitution has full force and effect in incorporated territories;
while in unincorporated territories, the Constitution does not fully
apply. In other words, when determining the reach of the Constitu-
tion, and the Bill of Rights in particular, the Constitution only follows
the incorporated flag.
While the credit for this distinction is often given to Justice
White's concurring opinion in Downes v. Bidwell, it actually is of
slightly earlier vintage. Legal scholar Abbott Lawrence Lowell first
proposed the idea of drawing a distinction between incorporated and
unincorporated territories in a May 1899 article for the Harvard Law
Review.65 Lowell's analysis was lengthy, but its impact was so great
that his entire conclusion is worth reprinting:
62 182 U.S. 1 (1901).
63 KERR, supra note 13, at 66.
6 As Gerald Neuman points out, the term incorporation can be confusing for those new to
the literature because it is traditionally used in the context of applying the Bill of Rights to
states. While territorial incorporation also deals with the application of the Bill of Rights, it
applies to the status of the territory rather than the status of the right. GERALD NEUMAN,
STRANGERS TO THE CoNSTrrTTON: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 83 n.c
(1996). See also Edward C. Carter, IIl, The Extra-Territorial Reach of the Privilege Against Self
Incrimination or Does the Privilege "Follow the Flag?", 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 313, 320 (2001)
(defining incorporation in regards to territories).
65 Abbott L. Lowell, The Status of Our New Possessions-A Third View, 13 HARV. L.
REv. 21 (1899).
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The theory, therefore, which best interprets the Constitution
in the light of history, and which accords most completely
with the authorities, would seem to be that territory may be so
annexed as to make it a part of the United States, and that if
so all the general restrictions in the Constitution apply to it,
save those on the organization of the judiciary; but that pos-
sessions may also be so acquired as not to form part of the
United States, and in that case constitutional limitations, such
as those requiring uniformity of taxation and trial by jury, do
not apply. It may well be that some provisions have a univer-
sal bearing because they are in form restrictions upon the
power of Congress rather than reservations of rights. Such are
the provisions that no bill of attainder or ex post facto law
shall be passed, that no title of nobility shall be granted, and
that a regular statement and account of all public moneys
shall be published from time to time. These rules stand upon
a different footing from the rights guaranteed to the citizens,
many of which are inapplicable except among a people whose
social and political evolution has been consonant with our
own.
66
The first portion of Lowell's analysis deals with territory directly
incorporated into the Union such as Florida or the Louisiana Pur-
chase. The second portion deals with territories such as Puerto Rico
and the Philippines that he, and later the Court, would define as unin-
corporated. The final portion of the analysis deals with the portions of
the Constitution that apply regardless of the status of the territory.
These are provisions that apply because they operate directly on the
power of Congress to legislate in a given area, rather than powers that
arguably have limited application, such as the Uniform Duties Clause
discussed above, which only applies "throughout the United States."
67
The Court, or some members of it, explicitly adopted the entirety of
Lowell's analysis in Downes v. Bidwell.
i. Downes
There are two important positions articulated by the Court in
Downes v. Bidwell: Justice Brown's opinion for the Court and Justice
White's concurrence.68 Justice Brown's opinion is important because
he was the sole member of the Court in the majority of all of the Insu-
66 Id. at 176.
67 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
68 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
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lar Cases.69 Meanwhile, White's concurrence is important because it
lays the groundwork for adopting Lowell's analysis, which would
become the majority opinion in Balzac v. Porto Rico.
Justice Brown spends a great deal of time examining much of the
history detailed above before getting to the merits of the case. Once
there, however, he immediately adopts portions of Lowell's analysis,
drawing a distinction between constitutional prohibitions that "go to
the very root of the power of Congress to act at all" and those that are
only operative "'throughout the United States' or among the several
states.,70 Looking to provisions of the first type, Justice Brown spe-
cifically cites to the bill of attainder and ex post facto clause as well
as the nobility clause, both of which are cited by Lowell.71
Brown then goes on to examine provisions of the second class and
turns to the Uniform Duties Clause language mentioned above. He
also looks to the language of the Thirteenth Amendment to help draw
72this distinction. Justice Brown believed that the United States was
understood to encompass only "the states whose people united to
form the Constitution, and such as have since been admitted to the
Union upon an equality with them.,
73
On the other hand, in order to give meaning to the language of the
Thirteenth Amendment, which says its provisions apply in the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction, "we must treat [those
words] as a recognition by Congress of the fact that there may be ter-
ritories subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, which are not
of the United States. 74 This conception of the Thirteenth Amendment
seems strained, especially in light of the amendment's history. An
equally logical, and perhaps better fitting, conception of the amend-
ment is that its reference to "any place subject to [the] jurisdiction" of
the United States does not refer to U.S. territories, but rather areas
under the military control of the United States. Given the recent end
of the Civil War and the condition of most of the Southern states un-
der Union military control, it seems highly plausible that the language
of the Thirteenth Amendment was drafted to deal with that situation,
as opposed to the territories, which were viewed since Dred Scott as
part of the United States.
69 NEUMAN, supra note 64, at 86.
70 Downes, 182 U.S. at 277.
71 Id.
72 Id. (noting that the Thirteenth Amendment lists its area of applicability as "within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction" (emphasis added)).
73 Id.
74 Id. at 278.
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Justice Brown then turned to an examination of the treaty-making
power and held that "the power to acquire territory by treaty implies
not only the power to govern such territory, but to prescribe upon
what terms the United States will receive its inhabitants, and what
their status shall be in what Chief Justice Marshall termed, the
'American Empire.' 75 To this end, he examined the treaty provisions
and noted that in all prior cases the specific incorporation of the terri-
tory had been bargained for, which was not the case in the Treaty of
Paris. 76 He noted that in all the cases, there was an "implied denial of
the right" of American citizenship until Congress took some other
action to assent to such rights.77
Justice Brown concluded his lengthy opinion by comparing the
acquisition of territory by the United States as similar to that
78
exercised by other nations. He saw territorial acquisition and control
as a power of a sovereign nation, demanding express limitation of
congressional power by the Constitution as a necessary prerequisite to
limiting that power.79 The problem with Justice Brown's analysis is
that it ignores that the United States, at the time, was unlike any other
sovereign country in existence, in that it drew, and continues to draw,
its power from a written Constitution. Furthermore, in a system of
enumerated powers such as ours, the power to legislate over
territories must be explicitly granted, not explicitly limited. Once the
Court rejects Article IV, Section 3 as a basis for territorial
governance, which Chief Justice Taney did in Dred Scott, the Court,
and the Congress, must search elsewhere in the Constitution for the
power to legislate over territories. Justice Brown's view turns the
system of enumerated powers on its head. Based on this flawed
reading of the Constitution, Justice Brown declares Puerto Rico to be
"a territory appurtenant and belonging to the United States, but not a
part of the United States within the revenue clauses of the
Constitution ....
Justice White, in his concurrence, viewed the question, not as
whether the Constitution is operative, for he saw that as self-evident,
but rather "whether the provision relied on is applicable.' He went
on to state that "the determination of what particular provision of the
Constitution is applicable, generally speaking, in all cases, involves
75 Id. at 279.
76 Id. at 279-80.
77 Id. at 280.
78 Id. at 285.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 287.
S Id. at 292 (White, J., concurring).
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an inquiry into the situation of the territory and its relations to the
United States. 82 With this simple phrase, Justice White adopted
Lowell's analysis as to incorporated versus unincorporated territories
and whether provisions of the Constitution apply in those territories.
Justice White clarifies this when he defines the issue before the Court
as the sole question of "Had Puerto Rico, at the time of the passage of
the act in question, been incorporated into and become an integral
part of the United States?
8 3
Justice White then launched into an extended discussion of the
treaty-making power, going into much greater detail than Justice
Brown, and concluded that in order to be fully incorporated into the
Union, the Congress of the United States must acquiesce, and that the
treaty-making power alone is not sufficient. 84 He summarizes this
drawn out examination of the treaty-making power with the
following:
[T]he treaty-making power cannot incorporate territory into
the United States without the express or implied assent of
Congress, that it may insert in a treaty conditions against im-
mediate incorporation, and that on the other hand when it has
expressed in the treaty conditions favorable to incorporation,
they will, if the treaty be not repudiated by Congress, have
the force of the law of the land, and therefore by the fulfill-
ment of such conditions cause incorporation to result. It must
follow, therefore, that where a treaty contains no conditions
for incorporation, and, above all, where it not only has no
such conditions but expressly provides to the contrary, incor-
poration does not arise until in the wisdom of Congress it is
deemed that the acquired territory has reached that state
where it is proper that it should enter into and form a part of
the American family.85
Justice White then examined the contents of the Treaty of Paris dis-
cussed above and noted that it failed to provide for incorporation in
the same manner that earlier treaties had, and in fact, that the actions
of Congress expressed a desire that Puerto Rico not be incorporated.86
Justice White then concluded this examination with the now-famous
92 d at 293.
8 Id. at 299.
84 Id. at 312-43. See also Deborah Herrera, Unincorporated and Exploited: Differential
Treatment for Trust Territory Claimants-Why Doesn't the Constitution Follow the Flag?,
2 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 593, 613 (1992).
8 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 339 (White, J., concurring).
8 Id. at 340.
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proposition that "whilst in the international sense Puerto Rico was not
a foreign country, since it was subject to the sovereignty of and was
owned by the United States, it was foreign to the United States in a
domestic sense, because the island had not been incorporated into the
United States, but was merely appurtenant thereto as a possession.
' 's
Therefore, the challenged provision of the Constitution was inappli-
cable to Puerto Rico.
ii. Other Cases-From Downes to Balzac
While there are several other Insular Cases, the two that are most
relevant are Dorr v. United States88 and Balzac v. Porto Rico.89 Dorr
is important because it was the first time that the Court addressed the
application of the Bill of Rights to the territories of the United States.
It was here that the Court drew a distinction between fundamental and
procedural rights and ruled that the latter had no effect in unincorpo-
rated territories. Balzac is important because it marked the end of the
Insular Cases and the adoption of the TID by a majority of the Court,
thus ensuring over a century of colonial rule by the United States.
1. Dorr
Dorr dealt with the right to a jury trial encompassed in the Sixth
Amendment and whether or not that right extended to an inhabitant of
the Philippines, absent a congressional statute. Justice Day, writing
for the Court, held that until Congress saw fit to incorporate a terri-
tory, Congress was free to govern the territory as it wished.9° The
Court ignored the clear language of the Sixth Amendment and Arti-
cle Ell, Section 2 by noting that when Congress wrote the act for the
temporary government of the Philippines, they expressly exempted
the islands from Section 1891 of the Revised Statutes of 1878.91 This
section extended the Constitution to the territories of the United
States, and the Court viewed this exemption as conclusive in its
analysis.92
87 Id. at 341-42. Justice White concludes his opinion by discussing the obligation of the
United States levied by Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott that the US may not hold such terri-
tory indefinitely. Justice White rests on a presumption that the Congress will be faithful to its
constitutional duty and will end the occupation of any territory not found fit for eventual incor-
poration. Id. at 343-44. Sadly, a century of colonial rule has proven Justice White wrong, and
thus this article proposes several solutions to this problem in later sections.
8 195 U.S. 138 (1904).
- 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
90 Dorr, 195 U.S. at 143.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 143-44 (finding that § 1891 gives "force and effect" to the Constitution within all
territories).
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Article 1I, Section 2 of the Constitution requires a jury trial for all
crimes, except impeachment, which "shall be held in the State where
the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed
within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Con-
gress may by Law have directed., 93 This clause seems to be a clear
and unambiguous call for a jury trial in all cases. Furthermore, this
clause explicitly recognizes that crimes may take place outside of the
states, yet still be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The
only place where this could occur would be the territories. And the
clause is clear that in such a situation the trial of the crime shall be by
jury.
The Court's answer to this clear and unambiguous language was to
reach back to another of the Insular Cases, Hawaii v. Mankichi,94
which held that the right to a jury trial was not a "fundamental" right,
but rather was "merely a method of procedure., 95 The Court ended its
discussion of the jury right by concluding that
[T]he power to govern territory, implied in the right to ac-
quire it, and given to Congress in the Constitution in Arti-
cle IV, § 3, to whatever other limitations it may be subject,
the extent of which must be decided as questions arise, does
not require that body to enact for ceded territory, not made a
part of the United States by Congressional action, a system of
laws which shall include the right of trial by jury, and that the
Constitution does not, without legislation and of its own
force, carry such right to territory so situated.96
This analysis by the Court is interesting for two reasons. First, as
noted above, it ignores the plain language of Article I that allows for
a jury trial in an area subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,
but not in any state. Second, the Court locates the power to govern
territories in Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution, which Justice
Taney excluded in Dred Scott.97 This is especially odd in light of the
fact that the Court in Downes and other earlier Insular Cases used this
distinction noted by Taney to justify the distinction between unincor-
porated and incorporated territories. 98 Justice Taney's distinction be-
tween the territory held at the time of the founding and later acquisi-
93 U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2 (emphasis added).
- 190 U.S. 197 (1903).
95 Dorr, 195 U.S. at 144-45 (quoting Mankichi, 190 U.S. at 220).
96 Id. at 149.
97 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 445 (1856).
" DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 195-97 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244,
279-80 (1901).
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tions was the genesis for the TID.99 For the Court to now utilize Arti-
cle IN, Section 3 as a locus of congressional power undercuts this
initial distinction, and places the whole TID in doubt.
But this is not the sole area in which the Dorr Court ignored Dred
Scott. In the Dred Scott opinion, Justice Taney specifically mentioned
the jury right as one that extended to these newly acquired territo-
ries.1°° Justice Taney made this observation well before Congress
enacted Section 1891, extending the Constitution to all subsequently
acquired territories. This seems to indicate that the jury right does
apply of its own force. In fact, Justice Taney never cited a statute that
extended any provision of the Constitution to the territories involved
in Dred Scott, yet this did not prevent the Court from finding that the
Constitution applied there.'0 '
2. Balzac
Balzac was a case once again involving Puerto Rico and the jury
right, but this time the question before the Court was what is
necessary for Congress to incorporate a territory? The petitioner in
this case relied primarily on the Jones Act, the Organic Act of Puerto
Rico, passed on March 2, 1917,102 to support their assertion that
Puerto Rico was incorporated into the United States. The Court
rejected the petitioner's argument and held that if Congress intended
to change the relationship between Puerto Rico and the Union, it
would do so explicitly.
0 3
Mandating that Congress articulate its intent to incorporate a terri-
tory is an odd requirement for incorporation in this case. By granting
the inhabitants of Puerto Rico citizenship through the Jones Act, it
appeared that Congress explicitly manifested intent to incorporate;
however, the Court disagreedY°4 In fact, it is hard to imagine a greater
indication of congressional intent to extend the full protection of the
Constitution to the people of Puerto Rico than granting them United
States citizenship.
In order to safeguard this arguably anomalous result, the Court
then went on to state that citizens of the United States visiting Puerto
Rico were also not entitled to a trial by jury when visiting the is-
99 See supra Part IlI.A-C.
100 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 450.
101 See id. at 393.
102 39 Stat. 951. See also Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 305 (1922).
103Balzac, 258 U.S. at 306.
104 1d. at 308 ("It became a yearning of the Porto [sic] Ricans to be American citizens,
therefore, and this act gave them the boon.").
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land.10 5 "It is locality that is determinative of the application of the
Constitution, in such matters as judicial procedure, and not the status
of the people who live in it."'06 For the first time, the Court suggested
that U.S. citizens did not enjoy full constitutional rights in territories
within the jurisdiction of the United States. This is a highly puzzling
result given the rationale the Court used to deny rights to the inhabi-
tants of these territories. In reaching this conclusion, the Court based
much of its determination on racist discourse, fearing to grant these
privileges to "savages. ' 1°7 As deplorable as this language is, and even
assuming the Court was correct, these concerns would not play out
once Congress chose to grant citizenship to these "savages," and they
certainly would have no grounding when dealing with a citizen of the
contiguous United States visiting Puerto Rico.
iii. Incorporation and Constitutional Rights
As noted above, the Supreme Court tied the exercise of constitu-
tional rights to the status of the territory. In incorporated territories,
the entire Bill of Rights applies, whereas in unincorporated territories,
only some of it does. When deciding which rights should apply to
unincorporated territories of the United States, the Court has settled
on only applying "fundamental" rights.0 8 It is important to note that,
in this context, "fundamental" rights are independent from the rights
incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.°9
1. Fundamental Rights v. Procedural Rights
For purposes of unincorporated territories, "fundamental" rights
are those rights "which are the basis of all free government."" 0 Court
precedent clearly establishes that the Sixth Amendment right to a trial
by jury is not "fundamental" within the territorial context."' The
Court also held that criminal charges do not have to be presented to a




'07 See infra Part I.B.iii.2.
101 See Balzac, 258 U.S. at 298; Doff v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Hawaii v.
Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903).
109This is another unfortunate confluence of language that is used in the Insular Cases
context but that has also been used in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is especially
unfortunate considering both classes of cases use the term "fundamental rights" for deciding
which rights to apply. It suffices to say that just because a right has been deemed "fundamental"
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment does not mean the right is "fundamental" for territo-
rial purposes.
110 Carter, supra note 64, at 321.
Mll See supra Part l]l.C.ii.l (discussing Dorr, 195 U.S. at 138).
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grand jury.' 12 Based on these two holdings, one scholar has argued
that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination would
not be deemed "fundamental."'1 3 The Court has also held that the
territorial courts are not Article III courts, but rather are created pur-
suant to Article IV, Section 3.114
The final area in which the Court has dealt with a constitutional
right as it applies to the territories is a special case. In negotiating a
covenant in which the former Trust Territory of the Northern Mariana
Islands was made a commonwealth, the United States negotiated a
land alienation provision that restricted who could purchase land on
the islands for the first twenty-five years of the Commonwealth's
existence. 1 5 Despite numerous challenges to this provision under the
Equal Protection Clause, the Ninth Circuit has held that this land
alienation provision is legitimate, and that the Equal Protection
Clause essentially does not apply to the Commonwealth of the North-
ern Mariana Islands, despite finding that it was a fundamental right
that applied to Puerto Rico."
6
Overall, the Court's distinction between fundamental and proce-
dural rights seems highly strained and arbitrary. After all, of all the
proposed amendments offered by the thirteen original states, the First
Congress thought that the first ten amendments were the most impor-
tant to secure. Notably, among these rights was the right to a jury
trial. Indeed, as Justice Harlan pointed out in his dissent in Dorr, the
great legal commentator Blackstone commented on the importance of
the trial by jury." 7 Responding to a French writer who declared that
England's liberties must one day perish as had those of Rome, Sparta,
and Carthage, Blackstone replied that "the writer 'should have recol-
lected that Rome, Sparta and Carthage, at the time their liberties were
lost, were strangers to the trial by jury.""'18
Justice Harlan responded to this idea in his dissent in Downes v.
Bidwell. There he wrote that "[a] mistake in the acquisition of terri-
tory.., cannot be made the ground for violating the Constitution or
refusing to give full effect to its provisions."' 19 He went on to state:
12 See Mankichi, 190 U.S. at 197.
13 Carter, supra note 64, at 321.
14 Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922).115 Marybeth Herald, Does the Constitution Follow the Flag into United States Territories
or Can It Be Separately Purchased and Sold?, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 707, 711 (1995)
(arguing that the covenant's provision of alienation restrictions and a malapportioned legislature
"implicate[s] the substantive principle of equal protection").
116 Id at 718, 724. It should be noted that the alienation restriction ended in 2001.
17 Dorr v. U.S., 195 U.S. 138, 157 (1904) (Harlan, J., dissenting).1181d (quoting 2 Bl. Comm. 379).
119 182 U.S. 244, 384 (1901) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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The Constitution is supreme over every foot of territory,
wherever situated, under the jurisdiction of the United States,
and its full operation cannot be stayed by any branch of the
Government in order to meet what some may suppose to be
extraordinary emergencies. If the Constitution is in force in
any territory, it is in force there for every purpose embraced
by the objects for which the Government was ordained.1 20
This, it seems, is the proper view of the Constitution. Every provision
was viewed as fundamental by those who framed that great document.
It seems quite arbitrary to privilege certain rights over others, espe-
cially when, as here, we are talking about that most fundamental of
rights, personal liberty. As recent debates over the importance of ha-
beas corpus have shown, the right to be free from detention by the
government has been recognized since the signing of the Magna Carta
in 1215. The trial by jury has long been recognized as the fundamen-
tal bulwark against such arbitrary detention. To so easily dismiss it
does a disservice to the importance of this right and sets a dangerous
precedent for the future.
The only reason the Court ever sought to deny any rights to the in-
habitants of these far-flung territories was based on a racist view of
those inhabitants, reflected in much of the discourse utilized by the
Court in rendering these decisions.
2. Racist Discourse
In addition to the faulty distinction between fundamental and pro-
cedural rights, the Insular Cases are plagued by racist discourse used
by the Justices to justify the denial of rights to inhabitants of unincor-
porated territories. Worse yet, the Justices tried to cloak some of this
racist language in the guise of pushing "self-determination" for these
areas.
This penchant for racist discourse first raised its head in Justice
Brown's opinion in Downes. There, Justice Brown justified a denial
of constitutional protection because he found it "doubtful if Congress
would ever assent to the annexation of territory upon the condition
that its inhabitants, however foreign they may be to our habits, tradi-
tions and modes of life, shall become at once citizens of the United
States.'' Justice White is less subtle when he discusses the "grave
detriment" to the United States caused by "the immediate bestowal of
'201d. at 385.
121 Id. at 279-80 (majority opinion).
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citizenship on those absolutely unfit to receive it.' 22 Justice Day goes
even further in Dorr when he denies a right to a jury trial to territory
"peopled by savages."123
This overt racism has been recognized by several commentators,
and has been acknowledged as reflecting the spirit of the times. One
noted that some people of the time "argued that [territorial] inhabi-
tants were either unprepared or undeserving of certain 'Anglo-Saxon'
rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 124 Another commentator noted
that the Insular Cases emphasized the desire of the United States to
acquire territory "without conferring the rights of citizenship on sub-
jects who were racially unfit for it.' 25 Finally, one of those commen-
tators described the Court's casting of this denial as consistent with
democratic ideals:
Most audacious, however, was the Court's attempt to recast
its denial of constitutional rights to territorial inhabitants as
consistent with democratic theory. Because statehood, the
traditional solution to the anti-democratic character of territo-
rial governance, was unlikely for the new territories, the
Court felt compelled to package unincorporated status as a
vehicle for limited, local self-determination. . . . To force
rights upon an unwilling people, the court stated, would be
positively unjust because it would hinder them from ordering
their institutions in a way more faithful to their traditional
ways. By exempting territories from such unfamiliar rights as
jury trials, the Insular Cases Court claimed that it was provid-
ing territorial peoples with more latitude to protect their tradi-
tional ways of life through democratic decisionmaking1
26
This categorization, in light of the language quoted above, is
obviously false. It is a thin veil with which to hide the blatant racism
utilized in the Court's opinions. Furthermore, even if the Court were
absolutely sincere in its rationale, the groundwork for this reasoning
is no longer present. Puerto Rico, for example, has been a part of the
United States for over a century now, with much communication with
the mainland. If over a century of association has not "prepared" the
people of Puerto Rico to recognize the right to a trial by jury, then no
amount of association ever could. The most recently associated
122 Id. at 306 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
13Dorr, 195 U.S. at 148.
124Robert A. Katz, The Jurisprudence of Legitimacy: Applying the Constitution to U.S.
Territories, 59 U. C-f. L. REV. 779, 795 (1992).
12 Neuman, supra note 64, at 145.
126Katz, supra note 124, at 796.
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territory, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, which
signed its covenant in 1976, after nearly thirty years as a trust
territory, has been a part of this country for nearly thirty years. The
justifications on which the Insular Cases are based are no longer
present.
Furthermore, despite this "unfitness" or "unreadiness" to partici-
pate in the jury process, the Court has never once denied that Con-
gress could make the jury right applicable to these territories "peopled
by savages" with a simple legislative act. The fact that Congress has
failed to do so does not justify the continuing denial of rights. Rather,
the ability of Congress to act in this matter merely serves to undercut
the Court's rationale.
Finally, one aspect of the requested right that has been ignored is
its voluntary nature. The Court has long upheld the right of a criminal
defendant to waive his or her right to a jury trial and instead be tried
by the judge. If the people of Puerto Rico or other territories truly feel
the jury right is inconsistent with their culture, they are not required to
exercise it.
3. Reid v. Covert
No discussion of the Insular Cases would be complete without an
examination of Reid v. Covert.127 Reid is the closest the Court has
ever come to overruling the Insular Cases, and with them, the TID.
Reid dealt with the capital trial of a civilian accompanying the armed
forces in a military court. 28 Writing for a plurality of the Court, Jus-
tice Black declared:
At the beginning we reject the idea that when the United
States acts against citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill
of Rights. The United States is entirely a creature of the Con-
stitution. Its power and authority have no other source. It can
only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the
Constitution. When the Government reaches out to punish a
citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and
other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and
liberty should not be stripped away just because he happens
to be in another land. 12
9
1- 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
12Id. at 3.
129 Id at 5-6.
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Justice Black felt that the Constitution traveled anywhere the federal
government did. In effect, the Constitution "followed the flag." He
rested his argument on the language of Article III and its reference to
crimes that occurred outside the jurisdiction of any state.1 30 Justice
Black stated that given its natural meaning, the language of Article Ill
plainly envisioned the reach of the Constitution beyond the borders of
the several states, and that all the protections of that document, in-
cluding the trial by jury, would apply wherever the United States held
sway.
131
Furthermore, Justice Black specifically rejected the fundamen-
tal/procedural rights distinction the earlier cases drew. As he put it:
While it has been suggested that only those constitutional
rights which are "fundamental" protect Americans abroad, we
can find no warrant, in logic or otherwise, for picking and
choosing among the remarkable collection of "Thou shalt
nots" which were explicitly fastened on all departments and
agencies of the Federal Government by the Constitution and
its Amendments. Moreover, in view of our heritage and the
history of the adoption of the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights, it seems peculiarly anomalous to say that trial before
a civilian judge and by an independent jury picked from the
common citizenry is not a fundamental right.
3 2
He then launched into an extended examination of the history of the
right to trial by jury and a repudiation of In re Ross, the case that first
placed into question the right to a jury trial while abroad. 33
However, despite a firm belief that the Constitution extended
wherever the forces of the U.S. government could be found, as well as
his disagreement with the logic underpinning the fundamen-
tal/procedural rights distinction, Justice Black stopped short of over-
ruling the Insular Cases. Instead, he distinguished them as "in-
volv[ing] the power of Congress to provide rules and regulations to
govern temporarily territories with wholly dissimilar traditions and
institutions," whereas the basis for governmental power in Reid was





33 Id. at 9-12 (discussing In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1890)).
34Id at 14.
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[I]t is our judgment that neither the cases nor their reasoning
should be given any further expansion. The concept that the
Bill of Rights and other constitutional protections against
arbitrary government are inoperative when they become
inconvenient or when expediency dictates otherwise is a very
dangerous doctrine and if allowed to flourish would destroy
the benefit of a written Constitution and undermine the basis
of our Government.
135
While acknowledging that the Insular Cases should not be expanded,
Justice Black refused to take the final step of overturning them. Even
with this scaled-back view of the Insular Cases, Justice Black was
unable to gain a majority of votes. Therefore, it is doubtful that he
would have been able to garner a fifth vote for the more radical step
of overturning the Insular Cases.
Justice Frankfurter concurred in the result, limiting his focus to the
narrow question of the rights of civilian dependents facing capital
charges in time of peace. 13' Therefore, he never addressed the broader
issue of the reach of the Constitution beyond the borders of the states,
and in fact, his opinion makes no reference to the Insular Cases at all.
Finally, Justice Harlan concurred on the narrow grounds that the
Act allowing for trial of civilians before military tribunals could not
constitutionally be applied in time of peace.' 37 Looking to the Insular
Cases, he specifically found that the doctrine announced still had
some vitality.
I do not go as far as my brother Black seems to go on this
score. His opinion, if I understand it correctly, in effect dis-
cards Ross and the Insular Cases as historical anomalies. I
believe that those cases, properly understood, still have vital-
ity, and that, for reasons suggested later, which differ from
those given in our prior opinions, they have an important
bearing on the question now before us.
138
Rather than relying on the "rigid and abstract rule" called for by over-
turning the Insular Cases, Justice Harlan was content to look to the
conditions and considerations that would make the particular applica-




16Id at 45 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
137 Id. at 65 (Harlan, J., concurring).
138 Id. at 67.
139 Id. at 74-75.
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The Insular Cases are a product of history, of a time when separate
was considered equal, and this history is apparent in the language
utilized by the Court. Even if the Court was sincere in its belief that
denying these rights was best for the people of these lands, something
that is hard to prove based on the rhetoric utilized, the basis for these
decisions has long since vanished. Like its justification, the racist
policy of the TID must be allowed to fade into history. This article
now turns to a discussion of how this may occur.
IV. SOLUTIONS
Having examined the multiple problems with the TID, it is now
necessary to discuss a solution. An examination of the case law and
policy issues surrounding the debate over the extension of the Consti-
tution to U.S. territories reveals four potential solutions.
A. Four Options
i. Extension by Congress
The first, and most simplistic option, is for Congress simply to
pass legislation that extends the "procedural" rights to the territories.
This would entail the least change to the current system, and would
not extend citizenship to those thought "unfit" to receive it. As the
Court has pointed out in the Insular Cases, Congress has always re-
tained the right to extend the protections of the Bill of Rights to the
territories. 14° Indeed, the Court used the creation of a Bill of Rights
for Puerto Rico in the Jones Act to justify the conclusion that the fed-
eral Bill of Rights does not apply. 141 As seen in Dorr, Congress would
merely need to apply Section 1891 of the Revised Statutes of 1878 in
order to extend the full Constitution to acquired territories. This
would be, without a doubt, the simplest and least controversial option
for dealing with the problems described above. It would involve no
challenge to the Insular Cases and it would allow Congress to deter-
mine on a case-by-case basis which territories are ready to assume the
full burdens inherent in the American system of criminal justice.
ii. Incorporation
The next option would be to fully incorporate the territories cur-
rently held by the United States into the Union in preparation for
eventual statehood. As the Court has pointed out, and as the treaty
140 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
141 Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 306-07 (1922).
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language of other acquisitions implies, this has always been the even-
tual goal. Indeed, as the Court held in Dred Scott, this country cannot
hold territory indefinitely in a subservient role. Clearly over a century
of association with the United States has prepared Puerto Rico for full
incorporation. The idea of statehood has been bandied about in Puerto
Rico for almost two decades, which clearly shows that Congress has
considered incorporation in the past. As for the other territories, each
has been under the protection and dominion of the United States for
over fifty years, and this should be sufficient to orient the peoples of
these lands to American values and our political and judicial system.
Therefore, Congress could pass an act explicitly incorporating the
currently held U.S. territories and causing the full Bill of Rights to
apply there.
This could also be achieved on a case-by-case basis, so that Con-
gress could determine which territories are prepared for full state-
hood. This option may have some political repercussions if people in
the United States are opposed to granting statehood to these far-flung
territories. However, statehood would not be instantaneous. Rather,
the territories would be treated as former incorporated territories were
treated, and they would be granted statehood only after meeting cer-
tain goals set by Congress. This option, unlike the first, would fulfill
the command of Dred Scott that the US not hold territory indefinitely.
iii. Reversal of the Insular Cases
The next option is to reverse the Insular Cases and their idea of the
TID. This could be accomplished in two ways. First, Congress could
overrule the cases. Because the decisions are based on the Court's
view of Congress's intent in trading with foreign nations to acquire
territory, rather than on any specific view of Congress's constitutional
power, Congress may correct that view through a statutory clarifica-
tion.142 Alternatively, the Supreme Court could accept a case from a
person charged with a crime in one of the territories who is seeking to
enforce one of these "procedural" rights and use this opportunity to
overturn the doctrine. This would extend the full Bill of Rights to all
142 While it is true that the decisions are constitutional in nature, interpreting the reach of
the Constitution, the underlying question of territorial incorporation has always been an inter-
pretation of congressional intent. Congress could therefore, consistent with precedent and the
Constitution, clarify that all territories acquired were meant to receive the full protections of the
Bill of Rights, and thus the Insular Cases should be overturned. This is a slightly different
option than the one proposed above, because there Congress acknowledges the existence of the
TWD and merely incorporates the territory. This option would legislatively do away with the
TID, declaring that all current and future acquisitions, whatever those might be, are entitled to
the full protection of the Bill of Rights, regardless of the prospect for eventual statehood.
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land held by the United States regardless of the prospects for eventual
statehood and would firmly declare that the Constitution-all of it-
follows the flag.
Either of these options would solve the problems outlined above
while avoiding the deficiencies of the first two options, which are
discussed below. This would potentially have the same political re-
percussions as the second option, unless the Court made the decision,
which would give Congress political cover. While this backlash is not
likely to occur, it is a consideration that policy-makers must take into
account. However, it is also possible that the repealing of the TID
would allow the territories to retain their current status, which would
relieve the political concerns. 1
43
This option is fairly radical in either form. If the Court acts, it will
reverse over a century of precedent. If Congress acts, it may be
viewed as usurping the Court's power by legislatively overruling the
Court's decisions. While this tension is fairly typical when statutory
construction is concerned, when dealing with the interpretation of
treaties affecting the application of the Constitution, Congress is on
more unsure footing. In fact, it is quite common for Congress to legis-
latively overrule a Court decision when the Court has read a statute
more broadly or narrowly than Congress intended. On the other hand,
when dealing with treaties, the House does not have a say, and the
President is involved. Therefore, a legislative clarification might be
less acceptable. 144
iv. Independence
The final, and most radical, solution would be to grant independ-
ence to those territories that are still viewed as unincorporated. This
would fulfill Justice Taney's view that the United States cannot hold
territory indefinitely, while also removing the stain of the TID and its
racist underpinnings. This solution, however, should only be extended
to those territories that wish to end their relationship with the United
States, determined by plebiscite, rather than casting them out on their
own. As a result, it is perhaps the most incomplete of the solutions,
for evidence shows that at least some of the territories would not ac-
143 While this would violate Justice Taney's holding in Dred Scott, it may still be legiti-
mate. At least two territories have voluntarily chosen their current status, and thus there is no
problem of domination. Puerto Rico has voted in a plebiscite, rejecting statehood in favor its
current status. Additionally, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands negotiated
their covenant with the United States in 1976, and both parties mutually agreed to the current
arrangement. Thus, Justice Taney's concerns may no longer be valid.
'44 The problem of Presidential approval is solved through presentment of the clarifying
legislation. However, the involvement of the House in the matter of a treaty is still present.
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cept this option.145 Furthermore, based on the interconnectedness of
territorial economies with that of the United States, such a move
could be disastrous for the territories.
B. The Path To Take
While all four solutions would offer some form of relief for the
problems detailed above, the only realistic solution, one that would
provide more than just a temporary reprieve, is the overturning of the
Insular Cases, specifically Downes and Dorr. Congress should take
the step of legislatively overturning the TID and require the immedi-
ate extension of the full Bill of Rights to U.S. territories. The Court
should then bulwark this legislation by overturning the TID at its first
opportunity. There are several problems with asking the Court to take
this step. The first problem is the time frame. It often takes years for a
case to work its way through the system and be in a position to seek a
writ of certiorari. Second, once a case achieves this status, four jus-
tices must agree to hear a case, and five must agree to overturn the
TID. It is much easier, and much more realistic, for Congress to take
steps to overturn the TID.
While the issues outlined above would affect this option, they are
not insurmountable. I do not believe a large percentage of the popula-
tion has an opinion one way or the other when it comes to granting
statehood to territories, the United States has a long history of extend-
ing the equal protection of the law to citizens of the United States.
This belief in extending rights to those under the dominion of the
United States should overcome any animosity to allowing these terri-
tories to eventually become states.
As to the other proposed solutions, each has specific problems that
militate against applying them in this situation. As for the first option,
congressional extension of rights, it suffers from two main problems.
First, it leaves the TID intact, and thus any future acquisitions of terri-
tory by the United States would still be subject to the doctrine. Ar-
guably, in this day and age, the United States will not acquire any
other territory. However, one merely has to look at the occupation of
Iraq by U.S. forces to see how such an acquisition may occur.
While it is true that temporary military occupation is quite differ-
ent from permanent acquisition,' 46 nothing prevents the United States
from demanding a territorial concession from Iraq before removing
14 5 For example, Puerto Rico has twice rejected statehood, in 1993 and 1998. See Puerto
Ricans Say "No" to Statehood, available at http:lwww.cnn.comWORLDamericas/9812141
puerto.rico.0l/ (last visited Sept. 3,2006).
146See Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603 (1850).
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all troops, for example. This would be an acquisition of territory that
would remain subject to the TID unless Congress specifically pro-
vided for its incorporation. Thus, the problems could arise again.
Furthermore, Congressional extension of the rights does nothing to
undercut the racist views inherent in the idea of unincorporated terri-
tories. While it would extend the full protection of the Bill of Rights
to the inhabitants of these lands, it would do nothing to end the mes-
sage that they are "unfit" for citizenship or statehood. Simply extend-
ing the rights without overturning the TID still labels the inhabitants
of these territories as second-class citizens.
Similar problems arise with the simple incorporation of these terri-
tories. While the racist message is no longer present, there are still all
the problems associated with the existence of the TID outlined above.
The rights of the inhabitants of future acquisitions would still be sub-
ject to the whim of Congress. Furthermore, incorporation could be
problematic because it does signal a step on the road to statehood.
While people living outside of territories should not fear this, there is
strong evidence that the inhabitants of the territories themselves reject
such an option. Once again using Puerto Rico as an example, there
have been several plebiscites in which people have elected over-
whelmingly to retain their commonwealth status. In the true spirit of
democracy, all the rights inherent in citizenship in the United States
should be extended to the people of the territories without forcing
them to take on additional burdens and responsibilities they do not
wish to shoulder.
Finally, the independence option is not realistic. There is no
indication that the people of these territories would wish to be
independent of the United States, and in fact, such a move would be
economically disastrous for most, if not all of them. Furthermore,
independence could have a real impact on the security of the United
States. Many of these territories house strategic military bases that are
key to our forward deployment overseas. For example, until recently
the United States had a strategic firing range on the island of Vieques,
a part of Puerto Rico. Moreover, Guam has long been a forward
deployment area for the Pacific Fleet. Thus, granting independence to
these territories may be dangerous to U.S. security.
Additionally, having been under the control of one sovereign or
another for the last century, these territories may not be ready for in-
dependent governance. Certainly they would be unable to defend
themselves from foreign aggressors, which may prove to be problem-
atic for the territories in the Western Pacific as China seeks to expand
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
its influence in the area. Therefore, a continued relationship would be
mutually beneficial to both the territories and the United States.
Some may argue that the problems noted by the Insular Cases
Court are still true today, and that, separated from their racist origins,
they present very real concerns of forcing the views of the United
States on those unwilling or unable to comply with our particular sys-
tem of jurisprudence. There are three problems with this view. First,
the procedural rights that the Insular Cases dealt with are all waivable
rights. For example, if a particular defendant does not wish to have
his trial heard before a jury of his peers, he may waive his right, just
as those within the states may. Second, as we have seen in the context
of incorporation under the Fourteenth Amendment, the extension of
the Bill of Rights to new contexts can be achieved with a minimum of
disruption. States have had few, if any problems, applying many of
the Bill of Rights protections to their own laws.
147
Finally, there is the fact that the territories have been applying the
"substantive" rights protected for the last century with no problems.
Arguably, it is a bigger exercise of cultural hegemony to demand reli-
gious equality, free speech, protection from cruel and unusual pun-
ishment, and equal protection than to proscribe a certain method of
criminal adjudication. 148 Thus, these concerns are misplaced.
V. CONCLUSION
For over a century the United States has embarked on a policy of
colonialism that has relegated thousands of people to second-class
status. The racism of the turn of the century translated itself into the
constitutional policy that those living outside the boundaries of the
United States were not entitled to the rights of citizens even though
they are subject to its control. There is no principled basis for the
Territorial Incorporation Doctrine, which creates and maintains this
distinction. Furthermore, it flies in the face of precedent, which states
that the United States is not in the business of holding territory
indefinitely. Steps must be taken to end the doctrine of Territorial
Incorporation. After looking at the possible options, the best method
for solving the problems inherent in the status quo is for Congress to
take steps to legislatively overturn the doctrine.
147 There may also be a supremacy clause issue. It is unclear whether or not territorial
judges are bound to uphold the Constitution in the same way that state judges are. This would be
the proper subject of another article.
148There is no doubt that the Eighth Amendment had its impacts on the territories. In
Weems v. United States, the Court struck down a traditional Filipino punishment as violative of
the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishment. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
[Vol. 57:1
